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An insignificant protest against the caging of animals
at the Philadelphia Zoo in 1972 by a band of boisterous,
profanity-spewing radicals known as MOVE marked the
inauspicious beginning of a series of violent clashes be-
tween this increasingly lawless sect and brutal Philadel-
phia police officers. The confrontations culminated in a
shoot-out between MOVE members and police on May
13, 1985, in which a police helicopter dropped a bomb on
a heavily fortified row house occupied by MOVE. The
bomb sparked a firestorm which killed 11 MOVE mem-
bers and gutted 61 homes, leaving 250 people homeless.
Although only three MOVE members were named in po-
lice arrest warrants, the dead included five children
whose ages ranged from 7 to 14 years old. The series of
conflicts between police and MOVE ultimately claimed a
dozen lives and consumed close to $50 million in city
expenditures.
A driving force behind the violent confrontations was
MOVE's belief that it was consistently victimized by a
racist double standard of justice which quickly penalized
them for any infraction but failed to punish law enforce-
ment personnel for acts of illegal brutality. According to
MOVE, the police, public officials and judicial authorities
were co-conspirators in the campaign to suppress the or-
ganization's political and religious rights. "This is sup-
posed to be a Court room of justice," said Conrad Hamp-
ton Africa, one of the MOVE members incinerated in the
1985 confrontation, during a 1976 trial for assault of po-
lice officers. "Who is going to speak of all the injustices
that was poured down on the Organization ... masochis-
tic sheriffs and police officers beat me ...slammed my
face against concrete walls. When are these maniacs,
these criminals going to be on trial?"'
MOVE's unsuccessful $26 million federal lawsuit
filed against city officials in 1976 graphically demon-
strates the distance between the positions of MOVE and
Philadelphia officials. The complaint contended that
MOVE was subjected to "systematic harassment" for its
expression of constitutionally protected political and so-
cial views. The city's answer asserted MOVE was not in-
terested in expressing legitimate political and social
* Linn Washington is a reporter for the Philadelphia Daily
News and has covered MOVE since 1975.
1. Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855,
859 (1976).
views. "On the contrary, it is averred that the group
known as MOVE are individuals who want to conduct
themselves outside the law without any respect for proper
and legal authority."2
MOVE's complaints against discriminatory practices
by Philadelphia's police and judicial authorities coincide
with charges of racism levelled by local Black leaders
against city officials since colonial times. One historian
noted that Black Philadelphians have experienced "con-
stant discrimination" in the application of the laws.
Whites who attacked Blacks usually "went unpunished;
but if a Negro offended, the authorities smote him heav-
ily." 3 However, MOVE's anarchistic, anti-social behavior
mitigates its claim of being a blameless victim. MOVE's
propensity for physical assaults and disregard for the
rights of its neighbors are as abhorrent as the police bru-
tality it loudly denounces.
This article will explore the history of the confronta-
tions between MOVE and Philadelphia City officials in
the decade between 1975 and 1985, emphasizing the gov-
ernment's double standard of justice, particularly re-
flected in the results of the local grand jury investigation
into the 1985 shoot-out.
I. A revolutionary ideology is not
merely negative - it is not a mere
conceptual refutation of a dying social
order, but a positive creative theory,
the guiding light of the emerging social or-
der .. .
Kwame Nkrumah'
MOVE was created by Vincent Leaphart, a handy-
man and third grade dropout whose affection for dogs
earned him the nickname of "Vince the Dogman."
Leaphart, who later took the name John Africa5, has
2. MOVE v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 76-
1483.
3. Edward R. Turner, THE NEGRO IN PENNSYLVANIA:
1639-1861, 145 (1st ed. 1911, reprinted 1970). See also, A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE &
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS - THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 269
and 310 (1978).
4. Kwame Nkrumah, AxIOMS OF KWAME NKRUMAH
(1967).
5. All MOVE members adopt the last name "Africa."
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been described as a charismatic, compassionate man who
had an uncanny calmative effect on young children and
wild animals.' "There's a fine line between genius and
insanity and he crossed it," said MOVE's co-founder
Donald Glassey during a 1985 interview.7 Glassey was an
idealistic, white social worker and graduate student at
the University of Pennsylvania. The two men founded
MOVE in early 1972.
Within six months Leaphart had begun to recruit
members into the organization he initially called the
"Christian Movement For Life," then the "Community
Action Movement," and finally MOVE. "The name
MOVE is not an acronym and has no special meaning,"
stated a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights investigative
memo prepared shortly after the 1985 confrontation.
"MOVE's followers believe that technology is at the root
of today's problems and that a more primitive approach
to life - eating uncooked foods, spreading fecal matter
and garbage in their yards, sheltering stray animals and
rats, keeping their children out of school, and the like -
offers a remedy." 8 MOVE has never had more than 150
members, most of whom were part-time members known
as supporters or sympathizers. Many of Leaphart's rela-
tives became MOVE members.
MOVE is "absolutely opposed to all that is wrong"
and is dedicated to the destruction of the American sys-
tem, which it considers corrupt, decadent and racistly ex-
ploitative in economic, political and social terms.9 This
stance against 'the system' led to the governmental perse-
cution which MOVE alleged to involve "slander, conspir-
acy, intimidation, kidnap and incarceration, authorized
brutality, legal attempted murder and statutory at-
tempted extermination.' 0 "MOVE is a revolutionary or-
ganization, a family of clean, God serious people dedi-
cated to stopping man's imposition on life ...MOVE
tells the truth about this 'rotten, corrupt system . . ."
stated MOVE member Alberta Africa." Alberta Africa
was released from prison in May 1988 after serving her
entire seven year sentence for riot charges. She had re-
peatedly rejected parole conditioned on her renouncing
any affiliation with MOVE in exchange for early release.
According to a 1981 Third Circuit Court ruling,
"MOVE endorses no existing regime or lifestyle; it yields
to none in its uncompromising condemnation of a society
that it views as 'impure,' 'unoriginal,' and 'blemished.' ,'2
6. Philadelphia Inquirer, I (March 22, 1985).
7. 105 NEWSWEEK, 25 (May 27, 1985).
8. Interim Briefing Memorandum, June 3, 1985, from Civil
Rights Analyst Tino Calabia to Regional Director Edward Rut-
ledge of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Philadelphia
Special Investigation Committee, Files Box 2, Folder 20-1, Vol.
!1 ("PSIC files"). The Commission's files are housed in the Ur-
ban Archives Department of Palley Library on the campus of
Temple University in Philadelphia.
9. Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d
1025, 1026 (3d Cir. 1981).
10. MOVE v. U.S. Department of Justice, 555 F. Supp.
684, 685 n. 2 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
11. Letter to several Philadelphia judges (January 26,
1986). PSIC Files, Box 14, Folder 455.
12. Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025, 1027 (3d Cir.
1981).
Rejection of the social order and its legal authority is in-
herent in the MOVE ideology. 3 Unlike some other politi-
cal and religious dissidents, they hold themselves above
the legal penalties that are a consequence of pursuing
their particular convictions.
"You impotent mother fucker . . ." MOVE member
Delbert Africa said to Philadelphia Judge Joseph P.
Braig during a May 17, 1976 trial for assaulting a police-
men. "I'm not here because I broke your so-called LAW.
My purpose in this courtroom [is] to point out the imbal-
ance, inequality, injustice, and inconsistencies comin' out
of these courts of so-called LAW."" MOVE sees no con-
tradiction in proclaiming Constitutional protections for
its campaign to destroy 'the system' while vehemently re-
jecting any responsibility to be bound by the laws of the
land or to respect the rights of others - Black or white.
"When MOVE first surfaced in the early seventies we
were armed only with the truth. The system says that we
are entitled to freedom of speech ... (but) every time we
opened our mouths we were beaten, bludgeoned, kicked,
stomped, babies killed . . . .Finally MOVE decided we
weren't going to get beat anymore," said MOVE spokes-
woman Louise James Africa, a sister of MOVE founder
John Africa, during testimony before the Philadelphia
Special Investigation Commission (PSIC), a legally non-
binding blue ribbon citizens panel appointed by Philadel-
phia's Mayor Wilson Goode to investigate the May 13,
1985 confrontation.'" Louise James Africa owned 6221
Osage Avenue, the house bombed by police in the
confrontation.
A central element in the series of clashes between
MOVE and police was the use of profanity by MOVE
members. Police predicated their early arrests of sect
members on the use of obscene language. MOVE con-
tended there was nothing profane in its use of curse
words. According to John Africa's teachings the profan-
ity was not in the word but in the profane action behind
the word. "There is something downright backward with
a society of people who get so upset about a word that
cannot hurt," Louise Africa once noted.'" "While the
cops threw a mouthful of motherfuckers at MOVE mem-
bers on May 13, 1985, it wasn't the words that killed
them ... it was the action put behind the word bomb."'"
The teachings of John Africa were compiled into
13. Concurrence of PSIC Commissioner Charles W. Bow-
ser, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 354 at 381 (1986). This volume of the
TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY contains a full text of the Commis-
sion's Report; the forward to the PSIC's Report written by its
chairman, William H. Brown Ill; a concurrence to the Report
written by PSIC Commissioner Charles W. Bowser and a dis-
sent from two of the Report's thirty-one findings written by
Commissioner Bruce W. Kauffman. •
14. Verbatim transcript of proceeding prepared by MOVE
members. See also, Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353
A.2d 855 (1976).
15. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. C, 5 (October 28, 1985).
Section C was a specially published section containing ex-
cerpted testimony from the public hearings held by the PSIC in
October 1985.
16. Louise Africa, Statement in response to the Grand Jury
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"The Book" in January 1972 by MOVE co-founder Don-
ald Glassey. "The Book" became the organization's Bi-
ble. A 41-page MOVE chronology written in late 1974
stated:
These guidelines completely undercut, disprove and
substantiate that nothing in this system is working,
or has ever worked since its inception . . . .What
John Africa's guidelines have taught MOVE people
is that when the roots are sadistically criminal, ma-
lignantly exploitative, the stems will not blossom,
justice, equality, peace, love. The roots of this lifes-
tyle are corrupt, diseased and people, as well as ani-
mals, have been viciously exploited .. .it has been
made clear by our founder, John Africa, that you
cannot be against the establishment and carry out
any meaningful social change with the very same
established principle you are said to be fighting
against."
Few outside of MOVE have ever seen "The Book." Some
describe it as an eclectic mishmash of dialectical materi-
alism, traditional African philosophy and Far Eastern re-
ligious thought. One writer in 1973 termed it a "long se-
ries of rhetorical, irrational and abusive exhortations."' 9
John Africa is regarded by MOVE members as a de-
ity. John Africa's impact on Delbert Africa, a former
Black Panther Captain of Defense in Chicago, is typical
among MOVE members. "I thought I was heading in a
revolutionary direction," Delbert Africa stated in 1976.
"But upon reading the writings of John Africa, I realized
that the four years I spent with the Black Panther Party,
the armed confrontations with police, the attacking of the
government, the deaths of comrades was all for nothing
because nothing was changed and I see that all that had
nothing to do with true revolution, but was only the theo-
retical so-called revolution of historical masturbators. ' '20
MOVE's doctrine, based on John Africa's vision of
God-given natural law, shuns technology, formal educa-
tion and products of 'the system'-like processed foods.
"MOVE believes in Natural law," John Africa's sister
LaVerne Sims stated in 1985. "The sun is MOVE Law,
the rain is MOVE Law, the Hurricane, Tornado and Vol-
cano .... Everybody is equal under MOVE Law, cause
MOVE Law is God's Law. Man's law don't afford you
the same equality .... ."'I The group follows a "pure"
communal lifestyle: they eat raw vegetables and fruits,
avoid red meat, clean their teeth with roots instead of
toothbrushes, wear their hair in uncombed dreadlocks
and avoid doctors by treating themselves with herbal
medications. Citing garlic's medicinal properties, MOVE
18. This MOVE document provides a detailed chronology
of the organization's activities from its inception in 1972
through early 1975 from MOVE's perspective. PSIC Files, Box
2, Folder 180 (pages unnumbered).
1.9. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (April 29, 1975).
20. Letter from Delbert Africa to author (July 17, 1976)
(author has document on file).
21. Letter from LaVerne Sims Africa to PSIC chairman
William Brown (November 9, 1985), PSIC Files Box 22,
Folder 448.
members eat cloves of it as others eat candy. MOVE
women practice natural childbirth at home, biting off th(
umbilical cord and licking their babies clean.22
MOVE members have a near fanatical commitmeni
to calisthenics with all members doing 500 pushups anc
running 10 miles per day. The recognized physical prow.
ess of MOVE members became a factor in the acquitta
of three police officers charged with beating Delbert Af-
rica following the 1978 shoot-out. "In the instant case, it
is possible that the officers did use excessive force in sub-
duing Delbert Orr Africa. But that is mere conjecture..
. They knew of Delbert Africa's physical prowess ...
stated the opinion in the 1981 case. 3
The group's members claim miraculous results from
John Africa's lifestyle. "Merle Africa had cancer, Del-
bert Africa was crippled from a broken back suffered in a
car accident and doctors told him he would never run,
Debbie Africa was sterile," Alberta Africa stated in her
1986 letter. "Because of John Africa Merle don't have
cancer no more, Delbert can run as long and as hard as
he wants, Debbie and her husband have children. John
Africa gave MOVE the solution to all our problems, took
us off drugs, cleaned us up in mind and body, made us
healthy, strong, correct [in] the wisdom of understanding
of Life's law."24 MOVE's lifestyle also includes keeping
dozens of stray dogs and feeding them raw meat. Believ-
ing that "all life begets life," they compost their garbage
MOVE is "absolutely opposed to all
that is wrong" and is dedicated to the
destruction of the American system,
which it considers corrupt, decadent and
racistly exploitative in economic, politi-
cal and social terms.
and feces; thus their residences smell like pig farms. Be-
cause MOVE's doctrine "respects all life," nothing is
done to curb the rats and roaches attracted by the raw
meat and garbage. Since the mid-seventies MOVE has
been repeatedly cited for violations of the city's health
and housing codes.
MOVE's poor hygiene caused insects and rodents to
invade the Osage Avenue neighborhood, making life un-
bearable for the residents. 5 "I pulled up the shades one
day and the whole window was black with bugs. I almost
vomited," said Lloyd Wilson, who lived next door to
MOVE, during testimony before the PSIC. "We had
bugs in the house that we could not identify. We had
22. Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 (May 22, 1985).
23. Commonwealth v. Geist, 5 Phila. 210, 214 (emphasis
added).
24. Letter from Alberta Africa to Judge Samuel Lehrer
(January 26, 1986) in PSIC Files, Box 14, Folder 455.
25. Report of the County Investigating Grand Jury, Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, No. 86-007363 at 17
(May 15, 1986) ("Grand Jury Report").
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things that if you would hit it, it would get back up." 2 In
September of 1983 another neighbor who sought to rid
his house of vermin by using an exterminator "was as-
saulted by MOVE members who objected to the killing
of insects.
27
The rats, roaches and lack of even rudimentary edu-
cation for her children forced Valerie Brown to flee
MOVE in 1981 after a nine year membership. One of the
first MOVE members, Brown had been recruited by
MOVE co-founder Donald Glassey who became the fa-
ther of the oldest of her two daughters. Brown was at-
tracted by MOVE's "free and easy lifestyle where every-
body was equal. No hassles." But years of cult-like
conformity in which the slightest variation from dogma,
like combing her daughters' hair, would spark all-night
berating sessions, proved too much for Brown to endure.28
Other ex-members share Valerie Brown's less than
idyllic view of the group. "MOVE is not about honesty.
They are not the victims they portray themselves to be.
MOVE is about breaking down the system at anyone's
cost," stated ex-member Jeanne Africa in a 1986 op-ed
article. 29 "The time has come to expose MOVE for what
they are - a dangerous, destructive, fanatical organiza-
tion bent on destroying the system."
The conflicting views of former and current MOVE
members is just one of the many contradictory facets of
the cult. MOVE claims to be a peaceful group yet it has
repeatedly directed violence against members and non-
members. In December 1983, John Africa ordered his
nephew Frank James Africa, 26, to attack Frank's
mother, Louise Africa, with an ax. Nearly a decade
before the attack on Louise Africa, an elderly man living
across the street from MOVE's old headquarters, Monty
Lis, filed a private criminal complaint with the District
Attorney's Office accusing MOVE member Conrad
Hampton Africa of being among the group of MOVE
members who had repeatedly attacked him. Lis died of a
heart attack two weeks later. His complaint was dis-
missed two days after his death when he failed to appear
in cburt. MOVE members later took credit for causing
Lis' death.
MOVE proclaims an unswerving commitment to "the
truth" yet it has repeatedly demonstrated their dishon-
esty. Nine MOVE members were convicted for the fatal
shooting of Police Officer James Ramp on August 18,
1978. The incident resulted from MOVE's failure to va-
cate its North 33rd Street headquarters, as stipulated in
an agreement it had signed with city officials in May
1978 to end an armed standoff which had begun a year
earlier. In the days preceding the August shoot-out,
MOVE publicly stated its failure to vacate the ram-
shackled headquarters resulted from its having no money
to relocate. Yet in a federal lawsuit against city officials
filed in August 1980 MOVE sought repayment of
26. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. C, 4 (October 28, 1985).
27. Grand Jury Report at 17.
28. Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 (May 22, 1985).
29. Philadelphia Daily News, 32 (August 11, 1986).
$25,000 it claimed was in the headquarters when police
razed the building hours after the 1978 shoot-out. 0
Contrary to its stated Black revolutionary stance,
MOVE has a history of assaulting Black individuals and
castigating Black organizations from community-based
anti-gang groups to the Black Panthers. When MOVE
purchased 309 N. 33rd Street for its headquarters in the
summer of 1973, it used dogs to force four low-income
By the end of the decade police brutality
had reached such epidemic proportions
that the United States Justice Depart-
ment filed an unprecedented lawsuit in
1979 against twenty-one top Philadel-
phia officials, including Mayor Frank
Rizzo. The suit charged a pattern and
practice of unlawful police conduct in-
cluding physical abuse, unlawful use of
deadly force and disciplinary procedures
which condoned abuse.
Black families from the adjacent building, which the
group then illegally occupied. The PSIC found MOVE
used threats, abuse and intimidation to terrify their Black
neighbors on Osage Avenue in the year preceding the
May 1985 confrontation. MOVE readily proclaimed this
terror was a deliberate tactic to force neighbors to pres-
sure Black elected officials to secure the release of impris-
oned MOVE members. "MOVE's deliberate use of terror
included the intentional violation of the basic rights of
those living in the Osage Avenue neighborhood.""1 On
Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE conducted a 36-hour long
invective-filled harangue of its neighbors over its roof-
mounted public address system. Such amplified attacks
became regular occurrences.3 2
MOVE's history of assaultive behavior repudiates its
claim as a revolutionary group, said former Black Pan-
ther leader Bobby Seale during a 1986 college speech.13
"MOVE violated the cardinal rule," said Seale, now a
professor at Temple University in Philadelphia. "You
don't alienate the people, particularly the people around
you in the community. We (the Panthers) created too
many programs to serve the people." A revolutionary
group, Seale added, must have "goals ... objectives" and
MOVE does not. 4
30. Philadelphia Daily News, 9 (August 12, 1980).
31. Report of PSIC, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 354.
32. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. C, 6 (October 28, 1985).
33. Philadelphia Daily News, 16 (March 14, 1986).
34. Id.
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The rampant brutality pervading the Philadelphia Po-
lice Department during the seventies was a crucial causa-
tive element in MOVE's confrontations with city offi-
cials. Police violence - arrests without probable cause,
physical assaults, dog attacks in non-threatening situa-
tions and fatal shootings - occurred with such frequency
they could not "be dismissed as rare, isolated instances..
• .$35 In a suit against the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment, Federal District Court Judge John P. Fullam noted
in his opinion that city officials did "little or nothing" to
punish or prevent police abuse. 6
By the end of the decade police brutality had reached
such epidemic proportions that the United States Justice
Department filed an unprecedented lawsuit in 1979
against twenty-one top Philadelphia officials, including
Mayor Frank Rizzo. The suit charged a pattern and
practice of unlawful police conduct including physical
abuse, unlawful use of deadly force and disciplinary pro-
cedures which condoned abuse. 7 The City of Philadel-
phia paid more than $2 million in court settlements for
police brutality cases between 1975-1978 according to a
top NAACP official.3 8
Five months before the Justice Department lawsuit,
Mayor Rizzo had vehemently denied the existence of po-
lice brutality during testimony before the U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights. Rizzo contended that anarchists and
an anti-police press had manufactured the issue of bru-
tality. 9 The day before Rizzo testified, the president of
Philadelphia's Chamber of Commerce told the Civil
Rights Commission that the business community toler-
ated police brutality as a trade-off for safe streets.'0
The most likely targets of police abuse, Judge Fullam
found in Coppar, were poor Blacks and persons who chal-
lenged their initial police contact. William Ware, con-
fined to a wheel chair, was beaten by police on July 5,
1975 during an incident inside of a police station. He was
later charged with assaulting the police officer. Cornell
Warren was fatally shot in the face by a policeman on
September 23, 1978 as he laid on a sidewalk - hand-
cuffed. Warren was one of 162 persons fatally shot by
Philadelphia police between 1970 and 1978, a period in
which the fatality figure was five times higher than the
decade between 1950 and 1960." Philadelphia police
35. Coppar v. Rizzo, 357 F.Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
36. Id.
37. The case was dismissed for lack of standing, 482
F.Supp. 1248 (E.D. Pa. 1979), and lack of specificity, 482
F.Supp. 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1979), ad 694 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.
1980), four judges dissenting from denial of petition for rehear-
ing, 644 F.2d 187, 206.
38. Speech by Michael Meyers, assistant director of
NAACP, at symposium on "Police Practices & the Preserva-
tion of Civil Rights," sponsored by the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights held on Dec. 12, 1978. ENCORE MAGAZINE, 17
(February 1979).
39. Philadelphia Daily News, 3 (April 18, 1979).
40. Philadelphia Inquirer, I (April 17, 1979).
41. For an examination of Philadelphia police shooting be-
tween 1950-1960, see, Gerald D. Robin, "Justifiable Homicide
shot and wounded 148 people in 1974,42 more than twic
the number of police shootings that year in New York,
city with a population four times that of Philadelphia.
MOVE members fell into both of the categories o
people whom Judge Fullam found most likely to bt
targets of police abuse: poor Blacks and individuals wh(
challenged their initial police contact. From its inceptior
MOVE protested against a potpourri of targets: the
American Veterinarian Association, Buddhists, the Phila-
delphia School Board, Jane Fonda, Gulf Oil and
NAACP head Roy Wilkins. These protests often resem-
bled blockades with MOVE members using bullhorns to
conduct hours-long profanity-punctuated harangues ex-
pounding their philosophy. These protests invariably led
to encounters with police and arrests. Arrests of MOVE
members skyrocketed from thirty-three in 1974 to 142 in
1975, with few if any arrests accomplished without scuf-
fles between MOVE and police."3
MOVE's complaints of police abuse rarely elicited
any response. In a June 10, 1975 letter to the chairperson
of the city's Human Relations Commission, MOVE com-
plained of a series of injuries from alleged police assaults,
including a miscarriage suffered by Alberta Africa "as a
result of being kicked in the vagina by Matron Robinson,
while being held by 4 cops" inside police headquarters on
April 29 of that year. MOVE received no response to the
five page letter charging it was being subjected to "schiz-
ophrenic lawlessness" in which they were locked up for
breaking the "so-called law" while their tormentors es-
caped "without reprisal."""
MOVE was not alone in criticizing local authorities
for failing to respond to complaints of police abuse. "Phi-
ladelphians must look to the federal government for the
protection of our human rights," the director of the local
American Civil Liberties Union chapter stated in a May
26, 1977 letter to President Jimmy Carter. "The Phila-
delphia Police Department and the District Attorney's
Office are largely unresponsive to citizens' complaints of
police abuse."' 5 A year earlier the U.S. Supreme Court
had overturned Judge Fullam's 1973 order, upheld by the
Third Circuit, requiring broad changes in the Police De-
partment's procedures for handling citizen complaints.
The Supreme Court's reversal was based in part on find-
ing insufficient facts to show an affirmative link between
incidents of abuse and an formal policy of support for the
misconduct by city officials."6
During the mid-seventies many MOVE members
by Police Officers," 54 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, Criminol-
ogy & Police Science, 225, 226 (1963).
42. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. B, I (January I1, 1977),
citing a compilation of complaints about police abuse assembled
by the Coalition Against Police Abuse.
43. Statistics reflected in a graph prepared by the Civil Af-
fairs Unit of the Philadelphia Police Department showing num-
ber of MOVE arrests and court appearances between 1973-
1985. PSIC FILES, Box 17, Folder 179.
44. Letter from Merle Africa to Chairman Clarence
Farmer (June 10, 1975) (author has a copy on file).
45. Spenser Coxe, Executive Director, Philadelphia Chapter
ACLU, to Jimmy Carter (author has a copy on file).
46. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).
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were regularly incarcerated on charges including disor-
derly conduct, contempt of court and assault, but no law
enforcement personnel were ever censured much less con-
victed for assaults alleged by MOVE members. For ex-
ample, three male MOVE members were rebuffed when
they sought to have criminal charges lodged against a
group of Philadelphia prison guards arising from a vio-
lent fracas on February 24, 1978 in which they sustained
serious injuries. The trio - including Conrad Hampton
Africa - were charged with assault, riot and conspiracy
for attacking the guards. In a departure from MOVE's
stance of non-cooperation with authorities, the three men
fully assisted in the investigation of the incident."7 A
probe by the District Attorney's Office determined that
one of the trio had been assaulted by the guards.4" De-
spite finding no wrongdoing by the MOVE members in
the fracas, the District Attorney refused to bring charges
against the guards and merely dropped the charges
lodged against the MOVE members. "Typically, we were
charged . . . in an attempt to obscure the truth and jus-
tify our extensive injuries," stated a caustic press release
by MOVE a few days after the District Attorney's May
2, 1978 announcement of no prosecutions. "We see the
deceptively oriented prejudice of the District Attorney's
MOVE members represent themselves
because they feel they are better advo-
cates for their viewpoint than lawyers
whom they considered tools of 'the
system."
Office as being no different than the abusively sadistic
behavior of the guards that they are trying to protect."
The most notorious assault on a MOVE member oc-
curred during the August 8, 1978 shoot-out in which
three police officers attacked Delbert Africa as he was
surrendering. Widely viewed television and still camera
coverage captured the police kicking the unarmed Africa
in the groin, dragging him by the hair and beating him
with a police helmet. Delbert Africa was one of nine
MOVE members convicted of third degree murder for
the August 8, 1978 shooting of Officer James Ramp and
sentenced to 30-100 years in prison. The arrest of the
47. MOVE had refused to cooperate with the investigation
of the 1976 death of a MOVE baby which occurred during a
midnight melee with police. MOVE claimed that the infant was
trampled to death by a policeman after being knocked from its
mother's arms. The group rejected requests from authorities to
examine the dead baby although it had permitted the child's
corpse to be viewed by two City Council members. Philadelphia
Daily News 27 (May 24, 1985).
48. Memo Bernard L. Siegal, ADA, Investigations, to Phil-
adelphia District Attorney Edward G. Rendell, 10 (April 27,
1978). ". . .there may be situations when guards assault in-
mates. . .Indeed, the situation involving Robert Moses Africa
seems to us to involve exactly such a situation..." PSIC files,
Box 14, Folder 37-D.
three officers was delayed for almost a year because the
Police Department refused to provide their names to the
District Attorney. In a November 29, 1978 interview at
Philadelphia's Holmesburg Prison, Delbert Africa
commented:
The City and the D.A. has yet to arrest the officers
who stomped me in front of millions of TV viewers.
They got me in here on $150,000 bail but the cop
who shot and killed Cornell Warren is out on the
streets [without posting bail]. The cop who beats up
[Congressman Robert N.C.] Nix's [elderly] cousin
gets 2-23 months for aggravated assault. I've gotten
two and a half years for a simple assault. Is that
justice?"'
When the three officers were brought to trial in 1981
on assault charges, Philadelphia Judge Stanley L. Ku-
backi issued a directed verdict of acquittal - unre-
quested by either the defense or the prosecution - mo-
ments before the case was to be decided by a specially
impaneled out of town jury. Judge Kubacki explained
that his verdict resulted from the Commonwealth's fail-
ure to sustain its burden of disproving the officers' claims
of self-defense. "The entire world saw photographs of the
three defendants striking Delbert Africa . . . [but] . . .
any conviction returned by the jury would have been the
product of speculation ... since evidence as to intent was
legally insufficient," Kubacki wrote in his opinion.5"
Kubacki's verdict sparked widespread criticism for
appearing to apply a more permissive standard of justice
in the application of the law to police officers. "For Del-
bert Africa the decision was more evidence that the law
doesn't protect unorthodox behavior," wrote Philadelphia
Daily News columnist Chuck Stone in a February 6,
1981 column. "[Flor the majority of Philadelphians who
believe in a system of laws, not men, Judge Kubacki's
hip-pocket ruling trampled constitutional values." 1 One
member of MOVE proclaimed in a 1985 interview,
"MOVE members have been labeled terrorist time and
time again. If ever the word terrorist fit to a 'T' anybody,
it is Philadelphia's 'finest' policemen. They have terror-
ized a whole city of people in the name of Law and out-
law, in the name of order and disorder .... These "Mod-
ern Day Cowboys," Gestapo oriented henchmen have
literally terrorized people to death."52
Philadelphians familiar with MOVE contend the im-
49. Interview with the author (November 29, 1978).
50. Commonwealth v. Geist et. al., 5 Phila. 210. Judge Ku-
backi noted, "The Court could have allowed the case to go to
the jury. . .to render a verdict under difficult circumstances.
But if the jury had convicted the defendants, the law of the
Commonwealth would require the reversal of that conviction.
Therefore, this Court could not take what might have been the
easier road, but was required by law to take the case from the
jury and be the lightening rod for the great public controversy
that has surrounded this tragic episode from beginning to end."
Id. at 212, emphasis added.
51. Philadelphia Daily News (February 6, 1981).
52. Letter LaVerne Sims to PSIC chairman William Brown
(November 9, 1985). PSIC FILES, Box 22, Folder 448.
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pact of police brutality triggered increasingly violent re-
sponses from the organization. "Police brutality clearly
was an element in MOVE moving from just an obnoxious
group to low-grade terrorists," said Rev. M.L. Shepard",
a prominent local clergyman whose history with MOVE
dates from its founding in 1972 when members wor-
shipped at his church. On the other hand, for attorney
Charles Bowser, a PSIC member, it remains unresolved
"whether the MOVE organization became more abusive
as a result of violent attempts to suppress it by the police,
or because of its violent resistance of legitimate law en-
forcement."'" Although the report of the investigating
grand jury noted that MOVE evolved from a "non-vio-
lent, back-to-nature organization, to an extremist group,
well-practiced in the art of urban terrorism" it gave no
reason for the transformation.6"
III.
While MOVE viewed actions by the city government
as a coordinated campaign of official oppression, critics
of the organization considered such actions to be legiti-
mate responses to provocative behavior clearly exceeding
the bounds of constitutionally protected conduct. MOVE,
according to the grand jury report, frequently used "ex-
treme profanity and engage[d] in unruly and other be-
havior which caused them to be arrested" during their
frequent demonstrations in the mid-seventies. "Their sub-
sequent court appearances were punctuated by both dis-
ruptions and contempt citations.""
In an opinion frequently cited by Pennsylvania courts
in MOVE cases, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
State of Illinois v. William Allen that disruptive defend-
ants jeopardize their constitutional rights: "[I1t would de-
grade our country and our judicial system to permit our
courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their
orderly progress thwarted and obstructed by defendants
brought before them charged with crimes. '" During a
February 1977 trial of three MOVE members on disor-
derly conduct and resisting arrest charges, the defendants
and their supporters harangued the trial judge, hurling
invectives, ranging from "liar" to "sick ass mother
fucker," which resulted in contempt citations. In its opin-
ion upholding the contempt citations, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court stated that MOVE members
• . . attempted to bait the trial judge to the point
Where he was compelled to hold them in contempt
to maintain order, and they argue that he thus be-
came incompetent to judge them fairly and the trial
must be aborted .... There is absolutely nothing in
this record to demonstrate that the contempt find-
53. Interview with the author (May 20, 1985).
54. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 381.
55. Grand Jury Report at 14.
56. Id. at 14-15.
57. State of Illinois v. William Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346
(1970). Allen was repeatedly disruptive during his trial for
armed robbery. The Court held it was not unconstitutional to
remove defendant from the courtroom, after repeated warnings,
and to continue the trial in his absence.
ings in any way prevented a fair and impartial trial
on the merits . . . . On the contrary, the not-guilty
findings on many charges indicate that the court
ruled in favor of defendants where any reasonable
doubt existed."
MOVE's charges of systematic discriminatory treat-
ment by the courts are less documentable than its
charges of inappropriate conduct by police and public of-
ficials. John Straub, a former Assistant District Attorney
assigned to the MOVE cases during the crucial 1977-78
period, dismissed MOVE's claims of discriminatory treat-
ment by the judiciary as ludicrous. "MOVE demanded
every right a defendant has," Straub said. "They used
the system but they asserted no obligation to adhere to
the responsibilities of the rights they demanded."" None-
theless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned con-
tempt of court convictions of seven MOVE members in
1976 expressing its disapproval of literally binding and
gagging the defendants as a means of remedying their
unruly and disruptive tactics.60 The court discharged
three of the defendants for insufficient evidence and or-
dered a retrial for the remaining four on the grounds that
they were entitled to be tried before a court that had not
been subjected to their abuse. The majority's opinion pro-
duced a bitter dissent by the Court's Chief Justice, who
stated, "[t]he law has long recognized the need for per-
mitting a judge to summarily find a person in contempt
of court where that person directly and seriously affronts
the judicial process." 1
In a 1981 ruling, the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals expressed sympathy for a MOVE member who
sought to have prison officials supply him with the raw
food diet required by MOVE religious precepts. The
court nonetheless rejected the dietary request after find-
ing that MOVE did not qualify as a religion within the
purview and definition of the First Amendment.62 The
Circuit Court questioned why prison officials could not
consent to the dietary requests of MOVE "Naturalist
58. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Africa, 292 Pa.Super. 419,
433 A.2d 102 (1981). The opinion also noted that MOVE al-
leged "that their oral argument was improperly limited when
they were not permitted to read the guidelines espoused by their
founder, John Africa. This final allegation heavily underlines
and is at the heart of the defendants' misunderstanding of our
judicial system . . . . Proselytizing may have its place in Ameri-
can life but, in a courtroom, it is disruptive and the antithesis of
the trial's function."
59. Interview with the author (May 22, 1985)
60. 'Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855.
61. Id. at 867, Jones, C.J. dissenting.
62. Africa v. Commonwealth of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025 (3d
Cir. 1981). "MOVE does not claim to be theistic: indeed it rec-
ognizes no Supreme Being and refers to no transcendental or
all-controlling force. Moreover, unlike other recognized reli-
gions, with which it is compared for first amendment purposes,
MOVE does not appear to take a position with respect to mat-
ters of personal morality, human morality, or the meaning and
purpose of life. . . .[T]he MOVE philosophy is not sufficiently
analogous to more 'traditional' theologies." Id. at 1033.
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Minister" Frank James Africa, who later perished in the
1985 confrontation. "Especially in light of the apparent
willingness of [prison officials] to accede to the dietary
requirements of other prisoners, both for religious and for
medical reasons, it is not clear from the record why spe-
cial accommodations cannot be made in this instance for
a prisoner who obviously cares deeply about what food he
eats."6
MOVE's problems with the judicial system result
from a combination of racist repression by judges and
from their disruptive behavior in court and their insis-
tence on self-representation despite insufficient legal
training. MOVE members represent themselves because
they feel they are better advocates for their viewpoint
than lawyers whom they considered tools of 'the system.'
MOVE's lack of legal knowledge is evidenced by its con-
sistent failure to have federal courts review factual alle-
gations due to procedural defects in their complaints.
U.S. District Judge James Giles handled three wide-
ranging complaints filed by MOVE against various city,
state and federal authorities between 1980-1983. Judge
Giles noted in a 1981 opinion that "the amended com-
plaint is patently insufficient to support jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1332," demonstrating that the statute
was "not read" before it was pleaded. 64 Two years later,
flaws prevented consideration of the allegations contained
in a new complaint:
Paragraph two alleges that a child of a MOVE
member was 'trampled to death by cop Palermo
and other maniac cops;' various MOVE members
were brutalized by police, and no policemen
charged with murder, all on March 28, 1976. As-
suming all this to be true, the complaint states no
cause of action against any named defendant ....
Furthermore, no citizen has a right to have murder
brought. Finally, the incidents are beyond the pe-
riod of the statute of limitations."
The insufficiency of MOVE's legal aptitude has been
most dramatically illustrated in cases in which MOVE
members have chosen to put 'the system' on trial instead
of attacking the sufficiency of the criminal evidence
against them. In August 1988, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court upheld a lower court's denial of a petition for a
new trial filed by Dennis Sims Africa who claimed inef-
fectiveness of back-up counsel during a jury trial in
which he represented himself on charges resulting from a
May 20, 1977 armed standoff with police. The trial
judge, in granting Africa's request for self-representation,
warned, "[i]f the Court permits you to conduct your own
defense, and you are not successful, then you have to suf-
fer the consequences, you can't blame it on anybody
else.""' Africa was found guilty and sentenced to concur-
63. Id. at 1037.
64. MOVE Organization v. City of Philadelphia 89 F.R.D.
521, 523 (1981).
65. MOVE Organization v. U.S. Department of Justice 555
F.Supp. 684, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
66. Commonwealth v. Sims, PASUPER LEXIS 3004, 549
A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super 1988).
rent terms of 26 months to 7 years for the criminal con-
spiracy and riot charges and one to five years for the
weapon and terroristic threats charges. The Superior
Court, citing settled case law, termed Africa's petition
frivolous because he could not shift responsibility for his
own performance to stand-by counsel who occupied only
an advisory role.
6 7
Nine MOVE members were convicted in 1980 for the
August 8, 1978, death of Officer James Ramp in a 19-
week non-jury trial - the longest in Philadelphia's his-
tory. They represented themselves before being barred
from the courtroom for disruptive behavior. Two non-
MOVE members and a female MOVE member, all of
whom were represented by an attorney, were acquitted of
the same charges. Representing the two non-MOVE
members, attorney Oscar Gaskins won a pre-trial release
for Devita Johnson and a jury acquittal for Sandra Davis
on the same evidence used to convict the five female
MOVE members who pled pro se. Police testimony
stated that only the four MOVE men were armed and
the bullet which killed Officer Ramp and seriously in-
jured three officers came from one gun. "Sandra Davis
was charged with murder and she walked clean. Ben
Johnson represented [MOVE member Consuewella Af-
rica] and got her off on the murder charge," Gaskin said.
"The others may have gotten off if they were represented
by lawyers. MOVE was not revolutionary in asking for a
non-jury trial. No judge is going to let someone off who
is accused of killing a cop.""
IV. "While the conduct of City Officials in
handling MOVE is entirely unacceptable,
it is not the proper subject of criminal
prosecution ... ""
Grand Jury Report
"Attention MOVE. This is America. You must obey
the laws of the United States," Philadelphia Police Com-
missioner Gregore Sambor bellowed through a bullhorn
at 5:35 a.m. on the morning of May 13, 1985. He an-
nounced that he had arrest warrants for four MOVE
members believed to be inside of the heavily fortified
house at 6221 Osage Avenue.
For more than a year MOVE members residing at
6221 had threatened city officials and had terrorized
their neighbors in a desperate bid to gain release of thir-
teen imprisoned members - especially the nine jailed for
the 1978 shoot-out. The warrants charged the four
MOVE members with possession of explosives, terroristic
threats, threats against officials, harassment, conspiracy,
riot and disorderly conduct.
Sambor give the four named suspects fifteen minutes
to surrender. His ultimatum was immediately rejected by
an unidentified MOVE member using the organization's
roof-mounted loudspeaker. "Come on in and get us," the
MOVE member said. "You're going to be laying in the
67. Id.
68. Interview with author (May 22, 1985).
69. Grand Jury Report at 279.
8
Yale Journal of Law and Liberation, Vol. 1 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjll/vol1/iss1/7
MOVE
street. Bleeding in the street."" °
At the end of the fifteen minute period Sambor or-
dered police to begin their assault on the fortified MOVE
house which he knew contained a number of children.
Sambor had failed to carry out Philadelphia Mayor Wil-
son Goode's "poorly communicated" instructions to re-
move the children before assaulting the house.71
Gunshots rang out minutes after high pressure fire
hoses were directed at MOVE's rooftop bunker. MOVE
members and police engaged in a ninety minute shoot-out
in which police fired thousands of rounds from military
weapons including M-60 and .50 caliber machine guns.
The two police SWAT teams assigned to attack the
MOVE fortress from adjacent houses became pinned
down by police gunfire." Mistakenly thinking the gunfire
Sambor ordered Bomb Squad members
to spike the bomb with shrapnel "to get
them motherfuckers." [T]he bomb
... . contained C-4, a powerful mili-
tary high explosive, which was surrepti-
tiously supplied to police bomb squad
members by an FBI agent in early 1985.
to be from the MOVE house, the teams detonated high
explosive charges to cover their escape. The charges com-
pletely destroyed the front of the MOVE compound and
heavily damaged three adjacent houses. The force of one
explosion was "so great that a rear window air-condition-
ing unit was blown across the alley."73
After a five hour lull in the fighting, Commissioner
Sambor ordered the construction of a bomb that he
hoped would destroy MOVE's rooftop bunker. Sambor
ordered Bomb Squad members to spike the bomb with
shrapnel "to get them motherfuckers." 4 Both the bomb
and the satchel charges used by the SWAT teams in the
morning assault contained C-4, a powerful military high
exp!osive, which was surreptitiously supplied to police
bomb squad members by an FBI agent in early 1985."
Sambor later said that the bomb was needed to re-
move the bunker so that police could pump tear gas into
the house through the roof. The necessity of that tactic
was questionable since police could have thrown tear gas
70. Id. at 101.
71. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 361-62. PSIC Finding #14. The
PSIC criticized the mayor and other city officials for failing to
remove the children prior to the assault. The Human Services
Commissioner was specifically criticized for not demanding"any" information from police regarding protecting the chil-
dren. The grand jury stated that the failure to adequately in-
form police officers of the mayor's removal directive resulted in
police allowing a car containing MOVE children to cross a po-
lice barricade and enter the compound two days before the
confrontation.
72. Grand Jury Report at 113.
73. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 267-268.
74. Grand Jury Report at 154.
75. Id. at 258.
through the front of the MOVE fortress which had been
blown off in the morning battle. The bomb was dropped
on the MOVE fortress from a State Police helicopter at
5:27 p.m. without prior warning or offers to surrender. 6
The bomb failed to destroy the bunker but sparked a fire.
Shortly after 6:00 p.m., with flames leaping from
MOVE's roof, Commissioner Sambor decided to let the
house burn - opting to use the fire as a "tactical
weapon" to destroy the rooftop bunker.7 The fire was
out of control within thirty minutes and soon engulfed
adjoining homes. Temperatures inside the MOVE house
reached 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. MOVE members who
attempted to flee the raging inferno were driven back in-
side the burning building by police gunfire."6 One child
and one MOVE adult managed to escape the inferno and
were taken into police custody. Both were badly burned.
The raging blaze eventually destroyed sixty-one homes on
Osage Avenue and adjacent Pine Street, displacing over
250 people.
On the morning of May 14th, the charred remains of
five children and six adults were recovered from the
smoldering ruins of 6221 Osage Avenue. Only three of
the six dead adults and none of the children were named
in the arrest warrants. Authorities also recovered two .38
revolvers, two 12 gauge pump shotguns and a bolt action
.22 caliber rifle from the ashes of the MOVE house. Po-
lice said that they had armed themselves with exotic mili-
tary weapons like silencer equipped sniper rifles and an
anti-tank gun, in order to out-gun MOVE and prevent a
repeat of 1978 when a policeman was killed by MOVE
members armed with semi-automatic carbines.
Philadelphia was stunned by the events of May 13,
1985. Many residents saw the assault as another example
of police brutality. Police Commissioner Sambor justified
the assault on everyone in the house on the ground that
he considered the MOVE children to be combatants and
not hostages of their fanatical adult guardians.79 Blacks
viewed the assault as another extreme act of racism and
wondered how the brutal attack could have beei ap-
proved by Philadelphia's first Black mayor, Wilson
Goode.80 May 13, 1985, marked only the second time in
history that an U.S. city had been subjected to an air
raid. The first aerial attack occurred during the bloody
race riot on May 31, 1921, in Tulsa, Oklahoma when
white racists dropped dynamite from a bi-plane on that
city's Black community.
Formal demands for a grand jury investigation of the
May 13th confrontation were first issued on May 20th by
the predominately Black Ad-Hoc Committee of Con-
cerned Philadelphians for Civil Liberties. Noted civil lib-
erties lawyer William Kunstler volunteered his services to
the Committee, calling the confrontation "murder" com-
parable to the state violence of South Africa. Philadel-
76. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 366.
77. Id. at 368.
78. Id. PSIC Finding #28 ("Police gunfire prevented some
occupants of 6221 Osage Avenue from escaping from the burn-
ing house to rear alley.") is its most controversial finding. PSIC
Commissioner Bruce Kauffman dissented from this finding.
79. Id. at 388.
80. Based on interviews by author (May 15 - June 1, 1985).
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phia's then District Attorney Ed Rendell rejected the de-
mands for a grand jury probe. Three weeks after the
confrontation Mayor Goode appointed the Philadelphia
Special Investigation Commission (PSIC), an eleven
member panel composed of community and corporate
leaders, respected members of the clergy, renowned pros-
ecutors, a former top FBI office and a retired state Su-
preme Court Justice. The PSIC was initially greeted with
widespread skepticism as cronies selected to exculpate
Mayor Goode, but the PSIC's public credibility was
boosted when the city's police union mounted a legal at-
tack to block the probe.
81
PSIC staff, which included national experts in explo-
sives, fires, medical pathology and criminal investiga-
tions, conducted over 900 interviews and gathered
records from thirty-six governmental agencies before con-
ducting five weeks of public hearings, in October 1985, in
which testimony from ninety witnesses was broadcast live
on public television and radio. In a scathing report issued
on March 6, 1986, the PSIC repeatedly described the ac-
tions of city officials as grossly negligent and those of po-
lice as excessive and unconscionable.82 City officials, ac-
cording to the findings in the PSIC's report, had adopted
a non-confrontational, policy of appeasement toward the
transgressions of MOVE which allowed the situation to
fester for years and enabled MOVE to fortify the house.
The report chided city officials for not using negotiation
as a method of resolving the problem. When city officials
finally decided to take action in April 1985 - after frus-
trated neighbors vowed to take matters into their own
hands - the city hastily approved an ill-conceived as-
sault plan which culminated in the unconscionable deci-
sion to drop the bomb and let the fire burn. The deaths
of the five children, the PSIC concluded, appeared to be
"unjustified homicides" which should be investigated by
a grand jury.83
In internal memoranda, the PSIC criticized the local
U.S. Attorney and the FBI. Then local U.S. Attorney
Edward Dennis, now head of the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, rejected city requests that he intervene
to resolve the MOVE dispute during a May 1984 meet-
ing. He warned that he was unlikely to become involved
in the city's dispute with MOVE; in fact, he would only
intervene if the city violated civil rights norms in dealing
with MOVE. The FBI, which had supplied the Police
Department with thirty-eight pounds of C-4 explosive,
endorsed the assault plan. "The U.S. Attorney contrib-
uted to the events of May 13 by asserting an artificial
distance between his official duties and the events un-
folding on Osage Avenue," one PSIC document stated.
81. Id. at 269. Chairman Brown observed that the PSIC's
"first and most formidable adversary was public perception."
The perception that the PSIC's purpose was to "white-wash"
the May 13, 1985 confrontation began to shift with the attacks
from the police union. "[The attacks] enhanced the Commis-
sion's credibility. The columnists began to ask: If the [police
union] is attacking the whitewashers for conducting a witch
hunt, then what is it the police have to hide?"
82. For complete text of the PSIC's Report, see, 59 TEMPLE
L.Q. at 339-377. The Report contains findings and
recommendations.
83. Id. at 369. PSIC Finding #29.
"The FBI encouraged, promoted and protected the Phila-
delphia Police Department's offensive use of excessive
force, and, for this, the FBI shares responsibility and cul-
pability for the outcome of May 13, 1985."84
Besides the PSIC report, a second major investigation
of the bombing of MOVE was conducted by a local
grand jury, which was belatedly convened on May 15,
1986. It heard testimony from over 125 witnesses. The
grand jury's report, issued on May 3, 1988, mirrored
many of the PSIC's findings on the chronology of events
leading to the confrontation and on incompetence by city
officials. On the question of criminal charges, however,
the grand jury's report reached an opposite conclusion:
"Our investigation has, revealed considerable incompe-
tence and ineptitude. It has not, however, disclosed any
actions which we believe warrant the filing of criminal
charges." While failing to indict, the grand jury stressed
It strains credibility to suggest that
Sambor - who had two decades of law
enforcement experience - did not know
that dropping a bomb on a house con-
taining children and allowing the ensu-
ing fire to burn were reckless acts.
that it was not exonerating "those men responsible" for
the disaster. "Rather than a vindication of those officials,
this report should stand as a permanent record of their
morally reprehensible behavior."8 The grand jury's 279
page report termed the actions by city officials before,
during and after the May 13th confrontation "an epic of
governmental incompetence" marked by political coward-
ice, inexperienced planning and inept execution.88
The grand jury considered a number of criminal
charges ranging from reckless endangerment to murder.
However, it adopted the recommendation of Philadelphia
District Attorney Ronald Castille that after "applying
the law to the facts . .. " criminal prosecutions were not
proper, despite contradictory testimony of "dubious cred-
ibility" from top city officials and instances of outright
perjury by police officers. The grand jury approved Cas-
tille's recommendation by a 16-4 margin. Defending the
grand jury report, Castille said "[t]he pain we suffer in
the death of the children and the destruction of the
neighborhood would seem to lead to the conclusion that
crimes must have occurred on May 13. Our society can-
84. Memorandum from Emerson Moran, PSIC Communi-
cations Officer, to PSIC Chairman William Brown. PSIC
FILES, Box 2, Folder 20-1, Vol. I. The Grand Jury Report also
noted Dennis' rejection of requests for federal assistance from
city officials during the May 1984 meeting. "Dennis said that
simple loudspeaker threats did not warrant his intervention. He
did acknowledge an outstanding federal warrant for John Af-
rica, but refused to act on it without concrete evidence that Af-
rica was in the house." See Grand Jury Report at 18.
85. Grand Jury Report at 279.
86. Id.
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not condone prosecutions motivated solely by grief or
rage."'' 7 The crux of Castille's rationale in not prosecut-
ing city officials or police was his determination that
none possessed a clear intent to harm MOVE members, a
prerequisite for criminal culpability. "I was determined
that the investigation would be exhaustive, that no one
would be prejudged, that the law would be fairly applied,
and that there would be no scapegoats. Applying these
principles, I determined that no charges should be
brought."
"Maddening as it may seem, MOVE grand jury is
right" stated the headline of the lead editorial in Phila-
delphia's largest newspaper three days aftcr the report's
release. Quoting from the grand jury report, the Inquirer
noted that Mayor Goode and other high officials might
have been prosecuted under the old common law crimes
of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance but those
laws were abolished in Pennsylvania in 1973. "[T]here
are no laws against stupidity, incompetence and neglect
of government duties."88
MOVE members blasted the grand jury's report as
another link in the chain of repressive acts against the
organization by Philadelphia officials. "To know that a
house is inhabited by men, women and babies and make
a conscious decision to let a fire burn is a crime! Anyone
committing a crime ... is a criminal! It cannot be other-
wise!" Louise James Africa stated in a bitter forty-six
page response to the grand jury's report issued during a
press conference in June 1988.1' Louise Africa castigated
Castille's interpretation of criminal intent: "[Ylou need
to stop all this nonsense about lack of criminal intent...
[.1 [T]he bombing and burning up alive of men, women
and children was malicious and deliberate. If that bomb
had tore into your house ... you wouldn't rest until you
saw Wilson Goode and everybody connected with that
bombing in jail." 90
MOVE was not alone in its criticism of Castille. Dis-
tinguished attorney William H. Brown, who chaired the
PSIC, charged Castille with using a double standard of
justice. "[T]he grand jury has confirmed the belief of
many that in Philadelphia there are two standards of jus-
tice: one for the poor and minority and another for those
who are white and economically more secure," Brown
stated in an op-ed article in the Philadelphia Inquirer."
For Brown, there was "more than sufficient evidence" to
warrant indictments arising from dropping the bomb, al-
lowing the fire to burn and permitting police to use exotic
military weapons which "showed little if any concern"
for the safety of the children. "I am ashamed to be a part
of a legal system that treats the loss of life so cavalierly."
Clifford Bond, the block captain of the burned-out
section of Osage Avenue whose pleas for relief from
87. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. F, 7 (May 8, 1988).
88. Philadelphia Inquirer, 22 (May 5, 1988).
89. Louise Africa, Statement in Response to the Grand
Jury Report, Press Conference (June 1988) (author has a writ-
ten version on file).
90. Id.
91. Philadelphia Inquirer, 22 (May 5, 1988).
MOVE's abuses were ignored by city officials for two
years, stated,
I teach my children to respect adults and obey the
laws. What if governmental officials lie while under
oath? That is not a good example of fair and equal
justice, especially in a land that proclaims itself a
democracy and stresses protection of its people. Yet
that is the example that was set by the grand jury
when it decided not to indict any government offi-
cials or police officers involved in the events of May
13, 1985.92
Only two people have been convicted on charges aris-
ing from the May 13th confrontation: the lone surviving
MOVE member, Ramona Africa was convicted of riot
and conspiracy charges, and Black developer Ernest Ed-
wards, Jr. was convicted of stealing $137,000 from his
contract to rebuild the sixty-one homes destroyed in the
blaze. The lack of police convictions deeply disturbed
many Philadelphians. Echoing a sentiment frequently ex-
pressed on local radio talk shows and in personal conver-
sations, Pulitzer Prize winning Philadelphia Inquirer As-
sociate Editor Acel Moore wrote in an October 27, 1988
column: "It is ironic that our criminal justice system
could easily indict and successfully prosecute a person for
stealing $137,000 in connection with rebuilding the de-
stroyed homes but could not indict any public official or
find anyone else guilty for creating the catastrophe that
took 11 lives, including six children, and destroyed the
homes."
Similarly, the only non-MOVE member jailed follow-
ing the 1978 shootout was a Quaker named Richard
Kanegis, a member of a Quaker peace-keeping team who
was trying to defuse tensions between police and commu-
nity residents following the morning confrontation on Au-
gust 8th. Kanegis was charged with obstructing the law
after being arrested for blocking a policeman from mak-
ing an arrest when police suddenly charged the milling
crowd. Like many of the thirty-eight people detained dur-
ing the police riot, Kanegis claimed that he had been ar-
rested falsely. Kanegis, however, was the only arrestee
who refused to accept a deal to exchange a guilty verdict
for a suspended sentence. He received a sentence of
twenty-three months in jail. When he unsuccessfully ap-
pealed his Municipal Court conviction to Common Pleas
Court, the judge leveled an anti-MOVE tirade before
sentencing Kanegis. Kanegis spent 14 days in jail in early
1984 before being cleared during a special hearing in
which his new lawyer located documentary film footage
of the police riot which showed that Kanegis did not in-
terfere with any officer. The D.A.'s Office opposed
Kanegis' release claiming the film had been doctored de-
spite testimony from the award winning filmmaker that
the sequence was unedited.
92. Id.
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V. ".... the risk of harm to the children posed
by the plan was not so significant as to
mandate criminal liability.""3
Grand Jury Report
PSIC member Bruce W. Kauffman, a former state
supreme court justice, did not agree with the conclusion
of his ten fellow commissioners that the police firing of
over 10,000 rounds of ammunition in under ninety min-
utes at a row house containing children was clearly exces-
sive and unreasonable. Kauffman also disagreed with the
majority that the failure of those responsible for the fir-
ing to control or stop such an excessive amount of force
- including the use of military high explosives - was
unconscionable. "[T]he police were entitled to use deadly
force on May 13," Commissioner Kauffman stated in his
dissent which cited Pennsylvania's Deadly Force Statute.
"They were attempting to serve lawfully executed war-
rants upon persons this Commission has found to be
armed, dangerous, terroristic, and dedicated to provoking
a violent confrontation with authority .... Use of deadly
force was lawful and appropriate."94
Pennsylvania's Deadly Force Statute, Section
508(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a police officer
is:
(1) ... justified in using deadly force only when he
believes that such force is necessary to prevent
death or serious bodily injury to himself or such
other person, or when he believes both that:
(i) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest
from being defeated by resistance or escape; and
(ii) the person to be arrested has committed or
attempted a forcible felony or is attempting to es-
cape and possesses a deadly weapon, or otherwise
indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict
serious bodily injury unless arrested without
delay.9"
PSIC chairman Brown vehemently disagreed with
Commissioner Kauffman's application of Section
508(a)(1), arguing that the police assault was excessive
under deadly force standards set by federal case law9"
and Philadelphia Police Department directives.9 7 The De-
partment's deadly force policy states that officers shall
"exhaust all other reasonable means of apprehension and
control before resorting to the use of deadly force."98
"Clearly Section 508(a)(1) could never be interpreted to
authorize the use of deadly force against children against
whom no arrest warrants were pending and who were in
no way attempting to prevent the execution of an arrest,"
Brown stated in the Temple Law Quarterly article ac-
companying the publication of the PSIC's report. 9
"[T]he dropping of high-powered military explosives onto
the house when children were known to be inside consti-
tuted excessive force. The deliberate decision to allow the
fire to burn ...recklessly endangered the lives of those
persons within the house."1 '
The grand jury, however, agreed with Commissioner
Kauffman that Section 508(a)(1) negated charges like
murder, aggravated assault, risking catastrophe, and
recklessly endangering another person, which the grand
jury felt "arguably could apply" to police actions. 0 The
grand jury determined that all of the "assaultive police
conduct" began after MOVE initiated gunfire in re-
sponse to the police "executing judicially approved" war-
rants. 1 0 2 While "police probably fired far too many
rounds," the police gunfire was a "justified response" to
the provocation posed by MOVE's fortifications at 6221
Osage Avenue."0 3 "Use of C-4 [explosives] to accomplish
this goal cannot be deemed criminally excessive as this
force was applied only against combatants." 0 4
The grand jury did agree with PSIC chairman Brown
on the issue of the Police Department's failure to follow
its own directives on deadly force and hostage situations.
The Department's directive on hostage situations calls for
using trained hostage negotiators and stalling tech-
niques." 5 The grand jury report stated, "We are com-
pelled to note at least that had the procedures ...been
followed, it is almost certain that fewer lives would have
been lost. The failure of the Police Department's leader-
ship to follow or implement its own directives, of course,
is irrelevant to the issue of criminal liability."
10 6
The grand jury also agreed with Commissioner
Kauffman's dissenting view that there was no credible ev-
idence that any adult MOVE member was prevented
from leaving the burning house by police gunfire. The
grand jury and Commissioner Kauffman also discounted
the vivid testimony of the only surviving child, Michael
(Birdie Africa) Ward, 14, that Conrad Africa was driven
back inside by gunfire when he attempted to carry the
youngest child, 7 year old Tomaso Africa, to safety. Both
the grand jury and the PSIC found that MOVE members
did exit the burning building. PSIC concluded that six
people tried to escape but the grand jury concluded that
one adult and two children returned because of the mis-
taken belief that the police were firing at them and/or
due to confused, irrational decision-making that included
a possible desire to commit suicide.
The determination that police bullets did not block
MOVE members from leaving the burning building was
critical in the grand jury's decision to absolve Fire Com-
missioner William Richmond of culpability for his part in
the decision to let the fire burn. "We find that Richmond
could not foresee that MOVE members would remain in-
side and keep their children with them. We further find
that this intervening action precludes criminal
Grand Jury Report at 86.
59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 413.
18 P. Cons. Stat. §508(a)(1) (1982).
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PSIC chairman Brown criticized Kauffman's dissent
from the Commission's finding that police gunfire had
prevented escape of MOVE members. In addition to
Michael Ward's testimony, fire personnel and police of-
ficers, including a police inspector, also told the Commis-
sion they heard gunfire. "[Olne of the questions that con-
tinues to nag my brain," Brown stated, "is how did the
metal fragments that the FBI laboratory and the Com-
mission's pathology expert indicated were consistent with
00 buckshot pellets get into the body of one of the chil-
dren found in the rubble? The children were in the base-
ment throughout the entire day and it seems inconceiv-
able that buckshot pellets could have been fired into one
child's body while she was in the basement of the house.
I am convinced that she was shot at some point in time
when she was outside of the house."' 10 8
The grand jury heavily criticized many of the actions
and sworn testimony of Police Commissioner Sambor but
would not find that Sambor "committed any crimes for
which the requisite mental state is intent, knowledge or
recklessness."'"° As a result, Sambor, like Mayor Goode,
was not held to be criminally liable for proceeding with
the assault despite his knowledge that children were in
the house. Sambor's decision to use the bomb also was
not prosecutable because "the decision to let the fire
burn, not the use of [a bomb], was the root cause of the
loss of life and property."" 0 His decision to let the fire
burn was acceptable because there was "insufficient evi-
dence that Sambor intended that the fire do anything
other than destroy the bunker which he was empowered
to destroy.""'
The grand jury did criticize Sambor in a number of
areas. It "completely discredit[ed]" Sambor's revised tes-
timony that city Managing Director Leo Brooks played a
key role in the decision to let the bunker burn. "We have
no reason to believe that Sambor's memory three years
after the event, on the eve of our decision with respect to
possible criminal charges, is more accurate than it was
closer in time to May 13, 1985.""' Sambor's testimony
that he was unaware that gas cans were on MOVE's roof
was also discredited by the grand jury, citing testimony it
received from top police and fire officials who said
Sambor attended a May 11, 1985 meeting where they
discussed the risk posed by the presence of the gas cans
on the roof."' Sambor's denial that he told Bomb Squad
members to spike the bomb to "get them motherfuckers"
was questioned but the grand jury rejected the statement
as insufficiently corroborated." 4 While the grand jury
found evidence suggesting that Sambor participated in a
cover-up of the fact that a plan to use a demolition crane
to remove the bunker was rejected as too costly at
$6,500, no recommendation of filing charges for obstruc-
Id. at 204.
59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 282.






tion of the administration of law or other governmental
function under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §5101 was made "because
it is not clear what testimony is accurate and there is a
lack of any evidence of criminal intent.
1 1 5
The charges of recklessly endangering another person
and risking a catastrophe were considered by the grand
jury in connection with various actions and incidents on
May 13th. Under Pennsylvania's reckless endangerment
statute: a person commits a misdemeanor of the second
degree if she recklessly engages in conduct which places
or may place another person in danger of death or serious
bodily injury. 1 6 The risking catastrophe statute states
that a person who causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire,
[T]he grand jury found evidence sug-
gesting that Sambor participated in a
cover-up of the fact that a plan to use a
demolition crane to remove the bunker
was rejected as too costly at $6,500.
or seven other means commits a felony of the first degree
if she does so intentionally or knowingly, or a felony of
the second degree if she does so recklessly and a person is
guilty of a felony of the third degree if she recklessly cre-
ates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, ex-
plosives or circumstances contained in the seven other
categories"1
Although the events of May 13, 1985 were unprece-
dented, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office has
taken a stricter line in applying the reckless endanger-
ment and risking catastrophe statutes when prosecuting
persons not connected with city government. The D.A.'s
Office appealed a Municipal Court judge's 1986 dismis-
sal of charges against a street vendor charged with reck-
less endangerment and risking catastrophe in a case in-
volving the theft of electric service. The judge dismissed
the charges after finding that the D.A.'s Office had
failed to present sufficient evidence at the preliminary
hearing. The Superior Court approved the D.A.'s appeal
to reinstate the charges in May, 1988.118 The vendor was
operating a curb side variety store out of a bus which had
an illegal electrical connection. An electric company rep-
resentative had testified that due to the location of the
illegal connection in a residential area and the manner in
which it was installed "there was a potential there for
injury to anyone who may have been in that area.""' 9
D.A. Castille stated that fear of unsuccessful prosecu-
tions was a factor in his recommending no indictments to
the grand jury. 2 But the state's appellate courts have
115. Id. at 59.
116. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2705 (1972).
117. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3302(a)(b) (1972).
118. Commonwealth v. Morman, 373 Pa. Super. 360, 541
A.2d 356 (Pa. Super 1988).
119. Id. at 357.
120. Remark made in response to a reporter's question dur-
ing a press conference (May 3, 1988).
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shown no reluctance in strictly applying the reckless en-
dangerment and risking catastrophe statutes in cases in
which defendants claimed their actions accidentally
caused deaths. In early 1988, the state's Superior Court
upheld the conviction of a Philadelphia man who was
found guilty of manslaughter, reckless endangerment and
risking catastrophe for the 1984 death of a fireman re-
sulting from a fire he set in a vacant rowhouse next door
to his home which was frequently used by junkies as a
shooting gallery.12 ' The Superior Court stated that the
defendant should have known that firemen would respond
to the blaze, and dismissed his claim that he was not di-
rectly responsible for the fireman's death since all fires
set in urban areas eventually endanger firemen. The
court chided the defendant for setting a fire in a building
in which he knew people frequently slept. "The Common-
wealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence." 122
In a 1976 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed the dismissal of charges against a Philadelphia
man charged with the death of two firemen who died
fighting a fire caused by a lighted cigarette which he ac-
cidentally dropped while he was working in a section of a
plant where smoking was prohibited. 23 A Common Pleas
Court judge had found that the word 'catastrophe' as
used in the statute was not sufficiently precise and voided
the statute for vagueness. The Supreme Court disagreed:
"the degree of culpability required by Section 3302(b) is
very specific; a gross deviation from the standard of con-
duct that a reasonable person would observe in the ac-
tor's situation. The 'risk' proscribed by this legislation is
the use of dangerous means by one who 'consciously dis-
regards a substantial and unjustifiable risk' and thereby
unnecessarily exposes society to an extraordinary
disaster."'2
Although there may be dispute as to the applicability
of statutes that penalize failure to prevent a catastrophe
- these state that a person commits the offense if she
knowingly or recklessly fails to take reasonable measures
to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe if she knows she is
under an official or legal duty to do so. 2 ' However, there
should be no such ambiguity in applying perjury charges
against the police officers who gave false testimony to the
grand jury. The criminal liability of policemen for their
actions on May 13th may have been mitigated by the
battle field conditions, but there were no such extenuat-
ing circumstances inside the grand jury room. "The
grand jury determined that not only had various police
officers committed perjury, but that they had engaged in
a conspiracy to cover up their lies," PSIC chairman
Brown stated. "The statement by the grand jury to the
effect that the perjury committed by police officers was
121. Commonwealth v. Dykes, 541 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super
1988).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 364 A.2d 306
(Pa. Supreme Ct. 1976).
124. Id. at 311 (emphasis original).
125. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3303 (1972).
merely '. . . a footnote to the tragedy that left 11 people
dead,' is outrageous.
126
According to the grand jury, "the infantile deception
engaged in by these officers after May 13th is a petty
detail .... [E]nding this massive investigation by charg-
ing a few front line officers would not serve any purpose
or vindicate any interest when it was the City's high
elected and appointed officials who were at least morally
responsible for this great tragedy.
12 7
Brown's criticisms of the grand jury's failure to indict
the officers for perjury were echoed by former Philadel-
phia U.S. Attorney David Marston. The failure to bring
perjury charges, Marston stated, was a "startling conclu-
sion" and one of the grand jury's central failures.1"8 "Ly-
ing to a grand jury had always been known as perjury
and the conviction of low-level figures on perjury charges
has been the fundamental technique in every successful
probe of crimes by public officials from Teapot Dome to
Watergate," Marston stated. "Big crimes are solved by
working up the ladder of smaller crimes, and if smaller
crimes are dismissed as "petty details," it is axiomatic
that the major crimes will never be solved."
1 29
VI. "The primary issue to be examined is not the
radicalism (of MOVE) but it is our ability to
respond appropriately to radicalism without
perpetrating a more extreme radicalism.
PSIC Commissioner Bowser'
The events of May 13, 1985 presented perplexing le-
gal dilemmas in determining criminal culpability, but the
actions of city officials and certain police officers tran-
scended legally accepted standards of decency as surely
as did the actions of MOVE precipitating the clash. "It is
a crime in Pennsylvania to recklessly engage in conduct
which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury. Does anyone who watched
television on May 13, 1985 doubt that someone commit-
ted that crime?" Marston asked.'
Charges of double standards in the administration of
justice gain credibility in view of incidents in which dif-
ferent classes of individuals are blatantly accorded differ-
ent treatment. "Fairness is what justice really is," former
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once stated.
Absolving city officials for any criminal liability in the
deaths of the six children by simply apportioning all of
the blame to the adult MOVE members is not fair, just
or honest. "Neither the excuse, the legality, nor the expe-
diency can cleanse the stain of the blood of innocent chil-
dren," PSIC Commissioner Charles Bowser wrote in his
concurrence to the PSIC's Report.1 32 "The bomb and the
unrestrained fire are conclusive evidence of a wanton and
126. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. F, 7 (May 8, 1988).
127. Grand Jury Report at 273, 276-277.
128. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. F, 7 (May 8, 1988).
129. Id.
130. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 409.
131. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. F, 7 (May 8, 1988).
132. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 391.
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callous disregard for the lives and safety of the
children." 133
The lenience Castille displayed towards former Police
Commissioner Sambor is a clear example of a double
standard when compared to Castille's application of mens
rea doctrine in the case of Anthony Woodward. Legal ex-
perts throughout Pennsylvania contended that Woodward
was deprived of a fair trial due to actions by the police,
prosecutors and his court-appointed attorney. Woodward
was sentenced to life in 1984 when he was convicted of
being an accomplice in a fatal barroom stabbing in
which, according to trial testimony, he did not partici-
pate. Castille's office vigorously opposed Woodward's
motion for a new trial by strictly applying state case law
which declares that criminal intent can be formed in a
split second."" Such a standard of intent was never ap-
plied to Sambor.
It strains credibility to suggest that Sambor - who
had two decades of law enforcement experience - did
not know that dropping a bomb on a house containing
children and allowing the ensuing fire to burn were reck-
less acts. If Anthony Woodward can allegedly form crim-
inal intent in a split second - after seeing his cousin
(who did the stabbing) attacked by two men - why did
Sambor escape the same split second standard?
The exonerations granted by the grand jury rein-
forced the perception of double standards in the applica-
tion of laws, and so left many with the view expressed by
Osage Avenue block captain Clifford Bond that the
grand jury made a "political decision, instead of a right-
eous and just one." 136 Almost 147 years to the day before
the May 13, 1985 tragedy, a white mob, composed
largely of "gentlemen of property and standing"' 36
sacked and burned the newly built headquarters of the
Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society in downtown of Penn-
sylvania. No arrests were made for the May 17, 1838 ar-
son of Pennsylvania Hall because "the authorities de-
clared that the mob had been composed of strangers, and
that none were recognized."' 37
Some argue that District Attorney Ronald Castille's
recommendation against indictments was a proper exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion and not a political deci-
sion. But Castille's recommendation to the grand jury
perverted the equal application of the law as surely as his
predecessor's 1978 decision not to prosecute prison
133. Id. at 387.
134. For description of case see, Philadelphia Daily News,
50 (October 8, 1987). See also, case file: Commonwealth v.
Anthony Woodward, Court of Common Pleas Case No.2053-54
(1984). The D.A's Office acknowledges that Jerry Woodward,
Anthony's cousin, had the right of self-defense when he was at-
tacked inside the bar but lost that defense when he used a knife
against his unarmed attacker. As an accomplice, according to
the D.A., Anthony Woodward was liable for the same life sen-
tence. Legal experts who've reviewed the case say life sentences
for the Woodward's are outrageous. A Philadelphia judge va-
cated Anthony Woodward's life sentence in January 1989 or-
dering new post-trial appeals after a finding that his original
court-appointed attorney was woefully incompetent.
135. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. F, 7 (May 8, 1988).
136. Julie Winch, PHILADELPHIA'S BLACK ELITE, 148.
137. Edward R. Turner, THE NEGRO IN PENNSYLVANIA:
1639-1861, 163 (1911, reprinted 1970).
guards for beating a MOVE member despite an undis-
puted finding of illegal conduct by the attacking guards.
Castille's recommendation - like Judge Kubacki's di-
rected verdict of acquittal in the 1981 Delbert Africa
case - short circuited the orderly working of the justice
system.
"The test to be applied in determining whether or not
someone should be indicted is merely a reasonable belief
in a crime has been committed," PSIC chairman Brown
wrote in 1988 reaction to the grand jury's report. "I do
not mean to suggest that convictions of persons who
might have been indicted . . . would have occurred, but
that determination should have been made by a jury
charged with the responsibility of determining guilt or
innocence."'
38
Four months after the Philadelphia grand jury issued
its findings, a federal grand jury - investigating possible
civil rights violations, particularly regarding the death of
the children - issued a press release stating its year-long
probe "yielded no indictments."1 9 Assistant Attorney
General William Bradford Reynolds, head of the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division, praised the thorough
and professional investigation of a complex case by the
FBI, the very agency that had been criticized by the
PSIC for supplying Philadelphia police with the C-4 ex-
plosive used in the excessive assault and bombing.
Much has been made of the battlefield-like conditions
on May 13, 1985, yet the excessive force used against a
house containing children would violate provisions of the
Geneva Convention. Article 3, Part I of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of August 12, 1949 states that persons tak-
ing no active part in hostilities "shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely." This section prohibits "violence of
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture."'40 Sadly, city, state
and federal authorities abdicated their responsibilities to
protect the lives and civil rights of the MOVE children.
"Our social order was profoundly tested on May 13,
1985, and I must conclude that we did not pass the test,"
the PSIC Commissioner stated in his concurrence. 41
The dynamics that propelled MOVE's decade-plus
confrontations with the city were rooted in the denial of
the equal application of the law through exercises of
double standards. While MOVE members were not the
guiltless victims they claimed to be,"they correctly criti-
cized the double standards constraining equality in
America's law enforcement and judicial apparatus. "The
MOVE ORGANIZATION is saying there is nothing
more disruptive, abusive or profane than a system that
blesses upper class whites with a crown and poor whites,
138. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. F, 7 (May 8, 1988).
139. U.S. Justice Department press release (September 20,
1988). The press release quoted Assistant Attorney General
William Bradford Reynolds, head of the Department's Civil
Rights Division, stating the federal grand jury "will not issue a
report."
140. See A. Roberts & R. Guelif, eds., DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, 273 (1982).
141. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 409.
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Blacks, Puerto Ricans with a blackjack. '1 4 2
Racism is an aspect of the double standard of justice,
and the PSIC found racism to be operative in the 1985
confrontation. "The Commission believes that the deci-
sions of various city officials to permit construction of the
bunker; to allow the use of high explosives, and in a 90
minute period, the firing of at least 10,000 rounds of am-
munition at the house; to sanction the dropping of a
bomb on an occupied row house; and to let a fire burn in
a row house occupied by children, would not likely have
been made had the MOVE house and its occupants been
situated in a comparable white neighborhood. 1 4
MOVE has vowed to return and continue its confron-
tation with city officials. Local and national governmen-
tal institutions remain susceptible to the type of paralysis
presented by anarchists like MOVE because charges of
racism find resonance among the have-nots and societally
disenfranchised who also feel victimized by unequal
treatment from 'the system.' Speakers at a rally outside
of Philadelphia's City Hall on December 10, 1988 com-
memorating the United Nation's 40th anniversary of In-
ternational Human Rights Day repeatedly expressed the
view that the MOVE issue never will be resolved unless
"justice is served." One speaker, William Meek, director
of the American Friends Service Committee's commu-
nity-relations division stated, "The City's action [on May
13, 1985] violated any definition of human rights or
human being . .. 144
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once observed that jus-
tice, long deferred, has accumulated interest with costs
that will be substantial for American Society in both fi-
nancial and human terms. "White America must recog-
nize that justice for Black people cannot be achieved
without radical changes in the structure of our soci-
ety. '"14 Elimination of double standards in applying the
laws of the land is an essential element in the radical re-
structuring envisioned by Dr. King.
142. PSIC Files, Box 2, Folder 180 (pages unnumbered).
143. 59 TEMPLE L.Q. at 377. This conclusion was not an
official finding of the PSIC but was included in the section ti-
tled "Additional Comments." PSIC Commissioner Kauffman
dissented from this conclusion. PSIC Commissioner Bowser
stated in his concurrence, "Sambor testified that if the child of
one of the other families who lived in the 6200 block of Osage
Avenue had been in the house he would have made different
decisions and employed different tactics." Id. at 391.
144. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sect. B, 7 (December 11, 1988).
145. Martin Luther King, Jr., THE WORDS OF MARTIN Lu-
THER KING, 55-56 (1983).
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